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Résumé / Abstract
De nouvelles normes pour les audits environnementaux sont
actuellement en train dêtre élaborées et implantées par les gouvernements et les
entreprises. Ces normes mettent principalement laccent sur les systèmes de
gestion et les incitations qui encouragent un meilleur usage des ressources
environnementales. Cet article étudie un tel système, où la rémunération pourrait
dépendre en partie des conclusions dun audit environnemental. On trouve que
le salaire versé après la tenue dun audit devrait varier davantage que celui versé
lorsquil ny a pas eu daudit. On montre aussi que la décision deffectuer un
audit environnemental et le niveau du salaire espéré dans ce cas dépendent
essentiellement de la relation entre la prudence (ou la précaution) et laversion
pour le risque du manager. On montre finalement que linsertion daudits
environnementaux au sein des systèmes managériaux usuels poussera
certainement un manager à se préoccuper davantage de lenvironnement, mais
la redistribution de leffort de ce dernier pourrait bien ne pas survenir au
détriment de ses activités principales au sein de lentreprise. On discute enfin
brièvement du rôle et de lintérêt du décideur public dans lélaboration et la
promotion de nouvelles normes pour les audits environnementaux.
New international standards for environmental auditing are now
being actively promoted by public authorities and adopted by private firms.
One important feature of these standards is their emphasis on managerial
systems and incentives that support a wiser use of environmental resources.
This paper studies such a system, in which incentive compensation may be
based in part on the results of an environmental audit. It is found that optimal
wages after an environmental audit is performed should have a greater range
than wages paid when no audit has occured. It is also shown that the decision
to conduct an environmental audit and the size of the expected wage in this
case depend crucially on whether the agents prudence (or precautionary
motives) dominates or not his aversion to risk. It is finally found that the
insertion of environmental audits within current management systems would
certainly induce a manager to care more about the environment; moreover,
although this may come at the expense of less concern for other activities, we
find plausible circumstances in which properly designed environmental audits
overcome such a tradeoff and increase the managers attention to both
environmental and traditional tasks. The public policy makers role and
interest in promoting environmental auditing standards are also discussed
briefly.
Mots Clés : Analyse principal-agent multi-tâches, Audits environnementaux,
Aversion pour le risque, Prudence
Keywords : Multi-Task Principal-Agent Analysis, Environmental Auditing,
Risk Aversion, Prudence
JEL : D82, L15, M49
Quoted by Cahill and Kane [6], p. xii-1.
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1. INTRODUCTION
"What you don't know will hurt you."
[F. Friedman, Vice-President, Occidental Petroleum Corporation,
in a speech to the Chemical Manufacturers' Association, 1983]1
Since its first (mandatory) introduction in the US chemical and steel
industries in the late 1970s, environmental auditing has become a major tool for the
management of environmental resources [5, 11, 12, 18, 24]. Nowadays,
environmental audits are being routinely conducted within companies to define the
extent of their liabilities towards the environment, to check compliance with
environmental legislation, to test newly acquired land or buildings, and to assess
environmental risks, employees' safety, energy consumption, waste streams or
pollutant emissions [6, 15, 34]. Yet, despite its widespread use, environmental
auditing remains an evolving discipline. It seems quite likely that its practice will
change significantly in the near future. This assertion is based on the recent
development, and active promotion by public authorities, of international standards
for the practice of environmental audits and certification of environmental auditors
[4, 7, 8, 9].
Typical of these new standards is their emphasis on so-called
"environmental management systems", i.e. the way business and industry are
structured to address environmental, health or safety compliance and risk. The
influential International Organization for Standardization (ISO), for instance,
devotes a section of its forthcoming ISO 14000 standards - actually the first section
of itsGuidelines for Environmental Auditing - to audit procedures directed at such
systems [32]. This raises a number of issues. First, there is the matter of fit with
mainstream management systems such as financial appraisal and bonus calculation.
This is especially important if the new (tougher) standards for environmental
auditing are to be adopted voluntarily by industry. A related and key question is the
impact on business decision-making of carrying out environmental audits according
to the new norms. These issues are the topic of this paper.
At this point, given the relatively short history of environmental auditing
and the consequent scarcity of data, we must rely on formal analogies and theory to
address them. An obvious starting point is the extensive theoretical literature on
corporate audits, which is based on the principal-agent model. This literature
The name "multi-task principal-agent problem" might leave the impression that the agent is
2
actually performing several different assignments simultaneously, which he is not. An example of what
we have in mind here is, for instance, a project evaluator who might be more or less careful in assessing
the environmental impact of a proposal along with its financial prospects. John Hartwick suggested that
we rather call the problem a "multi-impact principal-agent problem". Indeed, this describes more clearly
the generic situation that we model. We will keep using the previous name, however, only to remain
consistent with the literature.
2
distinguishes two kinds of audits: those aiming to verify a declared outcome, for
example an announced return [26, 33], and those that provide information on a key
input, for example the agent's effort [1, 10]. The actual philosophy of environmental
auditing seems to favor the latter kind [see 32]. Our model will therefore be similar
to the one used by Baiman and Demski [1]. There is one major difference,
however. The matter here is not the total amount of effort that the agent delivers,
but rather the allocation of this effort between environmental and non-
environmental tasks. So building on recent studies [2, 3, 17] and our earlier work
[13], we use a multi-task principal-agent model. In such a model, the agent must
allocate effort between, say, a financial task and an environmental task. This2
allocation cannot be observed by the principal who can only infer the agent's effort
from some imperfect measure of performance on each task. Previous models of this
sort assumed costless and constant monitoring of the variables of interest - the
agent's effort on each task. In reality, every monitoring system is costly, and the
principal may decide against constant monitoring. In this paper, we suppose
therefore that financial performance is always monitored, but we endogenize the
principal's decision to audit the agent's degree of environmental diligence.
The model provides new insights for the management integration of
environmental auditing. One first result is that optimal wages after an
environmental audit is performed should have a larger range than wages paid when
no audit has occurred. A second finding is that in this context the agent's allocation
of effort is essentially determined by whether his prudence (in the sense of Kimball
[22]) is stronger or weaker than his aversion to risk; hence, the relationship
between these two features of the agent's utility will guide the optimal design of
environmental audits. When prudence dominates, for instance, it is better to run an
environmental audit if current profits are high and to offer the agent a larger
expected wage each time an audit takes place. Concerning the impact of
environmental audits on business decision-making, the model also indicates that the
insertion of environmental audits within current management systems would
certainly induce the agent to care more about the environment. Whilst this may
come at the expense of less concern for non-environmental activities, we find
Auditing seems to be an old practice indeed: it appears to date at least as far back as the Roman
3
Empire. In those days announcements from the authorities were communicated through official
messengers. To ensure that the announcements were made correctly, "auditors", who knew the
announcements just as well as the messengers did, accompanied them. The latin root of the word
auditing means listening (reported in Stans [32]).
For case studies of some of these companies and a description of audit methodology at that time,
4
see Harrison [15].
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plausible circumstances in which optimal environmental audits overcome this
tradeoff and induce the agent to increase his attention to both environmental and
non-environmental tasks. The intuition for this result is straightforward when the
agent's prudence dominates his aversion to risk. In this case, the agent's wishes to
be audited and of course that the audit result be a good one. Hence, the agent would
tend to work harder on financial tasks, in order to make high profits more likely, but
also on environmental tasks, in order to increase the probability that the conclusion
of an environmental audit be favorable.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section summarizes the
relevant institutional background that surrounds environmental auditing and the
related issues we address. Section 3 presents the multi-task principal-agent model.
Section 4 states and discusses the results. Section 5 contains conclusions and
remarks for environmental public policy.
2. BACKGROUND
For many years, auditing has been a key tool of the financial accounting
profession. Environmental auditing, however, began to appear only in the late3
seventies in large US firms such as US Steel (in 1977), Allied Chemical (in 1979),
General Motors and ARCO, as a response to rising environmental worries. In the4
1980s, the practice of environmental auditing spread further, particularly across the
chemical industry, under the public and regulatory impact of the Bhopal disaster and
new insurance contracts linking insurance fees to environmental risks and pollution.
In 1988, the US and Canadian Chemical Industry Associations jointly adopted the
Responsible Care Programme, which was the first significant multi-firm initiative
that specified environmental audits.
Those audits sought primarily to check compliance with environmental
regulations and their results were intended for a company's eyes only. There was
no precise common view of what an environmental audit was or how it should be
done. Words such as eco-audit, environmental audit, environmental impact
4assessment (EIA), waste and emissions audit, and cleaner production assessment
were given different meaning or were used interchangeably in various parts of the
world. Moreover, although the Responsible Care Programme noted the value of
audits as a tool for management evaluation and supervision, environmental auditing
was generally not integrated with any management control system [see 34].
By the early 1990s, company environmental audits were becoming quite
common, and the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) had started to promote
them. The latter's following definition made precise the multiple purposes of
environmental auditing and pressed for its embedding into broader management
systems. According to the ICC [18]:
[An environmental audit is] a management tool comprising systematic,
documented, periodic and objective evaluation of how well environmental
organization, management and equipment are performing, with the aim of
helping to safeguard the environment by facilitating management control
of environmental practices and assessing compliance with company
policies, which would include meeting regulatory requirements. [18, p. 6;
emphasis added]
At that time, a drive for quality was transforming industry. International quality
management norms, such as the ISO 9000 which sets up quality audits, were
gaining worldwide acceptance. In this context, the British Standard Institute
published in 1992 the first standard - the BS 7750 - for a management system
incorporating environmental auditing. ISO itself made a proposal for an
international standard of corporate environmental management at the Rio de Janeiro
1992 Earth Summit. This lead to an update of current ISO norms - the ISO 14000 -
which will include requirements for environmental management and auditing.
On April 10, 1995, the European Commission (EC) announced the
implementation of its so-called Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS). It
is now part of the Commission's environmental policy apparatus, and some firms
have already won registration under it. (In the United Kingdom, for instance, five
firms were registered in August 1995.) At the time of this writing, however, there
is still some debate about details of EMAS implementation. The principal issues in
dispute are the relationship between EMAS and the other environmental
management standards mentioned above, and the criteria for validating compliance
with standards. The EC did not want to use any existing national standards, which
rules the BS 7750 out of consideration for automatically satisfying EMAS. The
Commission has not recognized the ISO standards either, because it estimates that
Analyzing the standards-building process is of course beyond the scope of this paper. For the
5
interested reader, let us simplymention that American firms are especially fearful of being found legally
liable for infractions revealed by the audits - a risk that their European counterparts do not face. In fact,
not only are US firms liable for violations they uncover, they are also legally obliged to report their
findings to the prosecuting authorities. Of course, this provides them with strong incentives not to look
for problems.
5
international negotiations have rendered those standards "too weak".5
There may be several differences between the various auditing standards,
but there also are important common characteristics. First, these new standards are
generic: although they are mainly directed at industrial firms (as opposed, for
instance, to banks or public services), they are not tailored to any specific industry.
Second, and consequently, these norms are not concerned with measurements of the
environmental impact of a firm's activities. Rather, they are flexible procedural
guidelines for how to conduct an environmental audit and requirements for
selecting auditors. Third, these standards specify the scope of an environmental
audit. The audit report should include, for instance, an analysis of corporate policy
statements, management control systems, process controls, inspection and record-
keeping procedures, agreements with waste contractors, training activities, and
emissions records.
Finally, a fourth common feature of the new auditing rules is that they
make environmental auditing an integral part of broader, albeit still nascent,
environmental management systems. In a regulation statement concerning company
participation in EMAS, the European Commission emphasizes such systems,
defining them as:
(...) that part of the overall management system which includes the
organizational structure, responsibilities, practices, procedures, processes
and resources for determining and implementing the environmental policy.
(quoted in [34], p. 7)
A recent statement by the ISO articulates this definition further.
Key principles for managers implementing an environmental management
system include, but are not limited to, the following:
 develop management and employee commitment to the protection of
the environment, with clear assignment of accountability and
responsibility; (...)
 establish a disciplined management process for achieving targeted
performance levels; (...)
 assess environmental performance against appropriate policies,
objectives and targets and seek continual improvement where
See, for instance, ICC [18]: "To be effective, [audit] reviews need to be conducted within a
6
structured management system, integrated with overall management activity."
6
appropriate (...). (quoted in [34], p. 8; emphasis added]
As many researchers, consultants and business persons have remarked, however,
fulfilling such principles presupposes that they be feasible within a mainstream
management system and its current rewards and financial incentives. Actually, they6
may not: surveys of management practice [24, 31] suggest that companies do not
explicitly link environmental audit results to the evaluation and compensation of
employees. One goal of this paper is to examine whether this is nevertheless
possible (and desirable). The analysis that follows concedes that protecting the
environment is not the main objective of the firm, but the principal may consent to
do so because environmental negligence can have significant consequences on
profit. The agent is therefore expected to first take care of traditional business
functions but to devote a "reasonable" fraction of his time to environmental
protection. The agent's compensation is linked to his performance in regular
business tasks, which is routinely monitored, and to his environmental performance
whenever it is audited. Ultimately, the presence of verifiable environmental audits
that influence compensation should change the agent's effort allocation and the
principal's profit.
3. THE MODEL
The introduction of environmental audits in a firm can be viewed as an
amendment to current management information systems. Since Holmström's [16]
seminal work (see also Kim [21]), formal economic studies of such systems have
been done using principal-agent modelling. Although these studies were prompted
by problems specific to the fields of accounting and corporate finance, direct
analogies can now be made between financial and environmental audits. Indeed, the
widespread adoption of publicly-endorsed international norms of environmental
auditing should make it possible to draw explicit contracts that make compensation
contingent on environmental performance. This supports the modelling approach
that follows.
Consider a one-period principal-agent relationship in which the agent must
split his effort between "regular" (profit-generating) activities and environmental
protection. Let the amount of effort spent on regular activities and environmental
Assuming that the set of signals is finite instead of continuous does not bear any consequences on
7
results. It just simplifies the exposition.
This is clear enough in the case of fines for environmental damage. But financial values can be
8
assigned as well to less explicit costs or benefits of environmental performance, such as its impact on
company reputation to customers, employees, shareholders, and community residents.
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protection be denoted by x and y respectively. The agent can vary both his total
effort and the allocation of that effort between the two tasks. The principal can
observe neither the agent's total effort nor its allocation; she can, however, receive
estimates B and , of the revenues generated or environmental costs reduced by the
agent's effort level and allocation. Those estimates are drawn from a finite subset
of real numbers according to the information technology g(B,,*x,y). We shall7
make the following standard assumptions about g.
ASSUMPTION 1: g(@*x,y) is strictly positive on its domain, for all x, y. At each
vector (B,,), it is twice continuously differentiable in (x,y).
Effort on regular duties is easily and routinely monitored through the firm's
standard financial reporting system. By contrast, effort to protect the environment
is costly to assess, so environmental audits may be infrequent. On the basis of the
information available (B) from financial monitoring, the principal may audit the
agent with probability m(B). If an environmental audit is done, a fixed cost K is
incurred and the estimate ,, which can be positive or negative, is received. The
principal then corrects her estimate of expected total profit (before wage and audit
costs) to B+,. Note that although efforts on the two activities are assessed
differently, we assume that the impact of each can be expressed in money terms.8
We shall now suppose that the influence of effort levels x and y on the
signals B and , can be perfectly separated: that is, y has no (direct) influence on B
and the same holds for xwith respect to ,. Hence, the information technology g will
be conceived as the product of two one-dimensional probability distributions.
ASSUMPTION 2: g(B,,*x,y) = f(B*x) h(,*y) .
This restriction of course simplifies the analysis. More importantly, it captures,
first, the fact emphasized above that environmental audits are a priori extraneous
to current management information systems, so they may not convey much
additional information on the way standard managerial tasks are handled, and
max
m ,s,w ,x,y
j
B,,
[m(B)(B % , & w(B,,) & K ) % (1&m(B))(B % , & s(B))]g(B,,*x,y)
subject to:
(x,y) 0 argmax
x,y
j
B,,
[m(B)U(w(B,,)) % (1&m(B))U(s(B))]g(B,,*x,y) & C(x%y)
j
B,,
[m(B)U(w(B,,)) % (1&m(B))U(s(B))]g(B,,*x,y) & C(x%y) $ U (
The principal's risk neutrality and the agent's indifference between tasks are not crucial
9
assumptions, but they again ease the analysis significantly.
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(1)
second, the idea that there may actually be no means but environmental audits to
assess the agent's degree of environmental care.
The principal is assumed to be risk neutral. The agent's behavior fits the
following assumptions.
ASSUMPTION 3: The agent has a utility U:(z,4)6ú for money that is strictly+
increasing, continuously differentiable, and strictly concave (i.e. exhibits strict risk
aversion). An effort vector (x,y) costs the agent C(x+y), where the function
C:ú 6ú is increasing, convex and twice continuously differentiable. C(0) = 0,+ +
C'(0) = 0, and C'(4) = 4.
The first part of assumption 3 is a standard one. The second part means that there
are decreasing returns to total effort, but that the agent is indifferent ex ante
between spending effort on regular activities or on environmental protection.9
The principal can now offer the agent a contract which includes the
possibility of an unannounced environmental audit and which makes the paid wage
in this case contingent on audit results. How frequently, or whether, audits are
actually done under this contract is a discretionary decision of the principal. There
are economic limitations to such a contract, however. First, it must provide the
agent with a utility at least equal to his reservation utility U , so that the agent would*
voluntarily accept the contract; this is the so-called individual rationality or
participation constraint. Second, it must take into account the fact that the agent
will set his effort level and allocation in order to maximize his own utility; this is
the incentive compatibility constraint. Let s(B) denote the agent's wage when only
the estimate B is gathered, and w(B,,) be the wage if there is an environmental
audit. The optimal contract will then be a solution to:
max
m ,s ,w ,x ,y
j
B,,
[m(B)(B % , &w(B,,) & K ) % (1&m(B))(B % , & s(B))]g(B,,*x,y)
subject to:
j
B,,
[m(B)U(w(B,,)) % (1&m(B))U(s(B))]g
x
(B,,*x,y) & C )(x%y) $ 0
j
B,,
[m(B)U(w(B,,)) % (1&m(B))U(s(B))]g
y
(B,,*x,y) & C )(x%y) $ 0
j
B,,
[m(B)U(w(B,,)) % (1&m(B))U(s(B))]g(B,,*x,y) &C(x%y) $ U (
The subscripts and denote partial derivatives with respect to x and y respectively.
10
x y
9
(2)
This is a typical principal-agent problem with multiple tasks and signals. An
additional decision variable for the principal here is m(B), the probability of
auditing the agent following observation of the profit estimate B.
The first-order approach
The incentive compatibility constraint of problem (1) is rather complex:
it hides a continuum of inequality constraints. To make the problem tractable, one
may replace it by (an approximation of) the first-order necessary conditions for
having a stationary point of the agent's expected utility. This leads to the modified
problem:
The approach that consists in solving this problem instead of problem (1)
is called the first-order approach. What matters of course is that all solutions to
problem (2) be also solutions to problem (1). It can be shown that this is the case
under the next assumptions, provided the solution m(B) increases with B (see [30]).
ASSUMPTION 4: [Monotone likelihood ratio property] The ratios f (B*x)/f(B*x)x
and
h (,*y)/h(,*y) are nondecreasing in respectively B and ,, for every vector (x,y).
y
10
ASSUMPTION 5: [Monotonicity and convexity of the distribution function] The
upper
cumulative probability distributions 3 g(B,,*x,y) are increasing and(B,,) > (B,,)
10
concave in (x,y).
ASSUMPTION 6: The first two constraints of problem (2) are both either strictly
binding or
nonbinding (i.e. their respective associated multipliers have the same sign).
Whenm(·) is not an increasing function, however, the first-order approach may fail.
We will simply assume that this is not the case here.
This completes the description of the model. We shall now turn to the
derivation and discussion of results.
4. RESULTS
Section 2 raised several questions concerning the integration of
environmental auditing within mainstream management systems. We will now try
to answer those questions using the above principal-agent model. The first
subsection explores the possible use of environmental audits as an input for
incentive compensation. The second subsection studies the optimal occurrence of
environmental audits. The third and last subsection focuses on the resulting effort
allocation chosen by the agent.
Environmental audits and incentive compensation
A key role of management systems is to align employees' private
objectives with those of the firm. Increased environmental awareness on the part of
shareholders and corporate board members will not change the firm's environmental
record in a significant and durable way unless it is translated into concrete
amendments of the existing managerial system. In many firms, an important
component of such a system is incentive pay which varies wages according to
measured performance. This subsection formally investigates how incentive pay
should be modified to incorporate the assessments of environmental performance
that come from environmental audits.
In the present framework, the incentive wage schedule that is put in place
by the principal would satisfy the first-order necessary conditions for an optimum
of problem (2). Let (, 8, * be the Lagrange multipliers attached to the first, second
and third constraints of (2) respectively. (Note that, these contraints being
inequalities, their associated multipliers can and will always be made nonnegative
in the expressions below.) The first two multipliers, ( and 8, are the shadow prices
 B : (1&m)j
,
[& f h % (U )(s) f
x
h % 8U )(s) f h
y
% *U )(s) f h] ' 0.
 (B ,,) : m[& f h % (U )(w) f
x
h % 8U )(w) f h
y
% *U )(w) f h] ' 0.
 B :
1
U )(s(B))
' * % (
f
x
(B*x)
f(B*x)
, and
 (B ,,) :
1
U )(w(B ,,))
' * % (
f
x
(B*x)
f(B*x)
% 8
h
y
(,*y)
h(,*y)
.
 (B ,,) :
1
U )(s(B))
&
1
U )(w(B ,,))
' &8
h
y
(,*y)
h(,*y)
.
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(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
of the incentive compatibility constraints on efforts x and y respectively. They
measure the increase in the principal's profit resulting from a marginal deviation by
the agent from his utility-maximizing effort on regular and environmental activities
respectively. The third multiplier, *, is the shadow price of the participation
constraint, which captures the increase in the principal's profit from a marginal
decrease in the agent's reservation utility, U . The necessary conditions for s - the*
incentive wage without an environmental audit - are now:
Those conditions for w - the incentive wage after an environmental audit - are:
Forgetting m(B) for the moment, (3) and (4) can be rewritten respectively as
Equations (5) and (6) must clearly be satisfied when 0 < m(B) < 1. Note, however,
that they can be made to hold as well if m(B) = 1 or 0.
A key relationship between s(B) and w(B,,) can be derived from the above
equations. Subtracting (6) from (5), one gets
We can now state some general characteristics of the optimal wage schedule.
PROPOSITION 1: Under the above assumptions, s(B) and w(B,,) have the
following properties:
(i) s and w are nondecreasing in their respective arguments.
 B :
1
U )(s(B))
& j
,
h(,*y)
1
U )(w(B ,,))
' 0 .
 B :
1
U )(s(B))
&
1
U )(j
,
w(B ,,) h(,*y))
# 0 .
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(8)
(9)
(ii) s(B) $ w(B,,) when , is small and s(B) # w(B,,) when , is large.
(iii) B: 3 w(B,,)h(,*y) $ (#) s(B) if -2(U''/U') # ($) -U'''/U'' .
,
PROOF: Statement (i) comes directly from the assumptions, in particular
assumption 4, and equations (5) and (6).
To show statement (ii), consider (7) and note that, since ' h (,*y) = 0
, y
and h /h is nondecreasing in ,, it must be the case that h (,*y) # 0 when , is small
y y
and h (,*y) $ 0 when , is large. The result now comes from the fact that 1/U'(·) is
y
an increasing function.
To prove (iii), first take the expectation with respect to , on both sides of
equation (7). This gives
If -2(U''/U') # -U'''/U'' , then 1/U' is a concave function. By Jensen's inequality we
have that
Hence B:3 w(B,,)h(,*y) $ s(B). If -2(U''/U') $ -U'''/U'' , on the other hand, the
,
function 1/U' is convex. Applying Jensen's inequality to (8) once again, one gets
an expression identical to (9) but with a reversed inequality. Therefore, B: 3
,
w(B,,)h(,*y) # s(B). Q.E.D.
The first part of the proposition is unsurprising: wages should rise with
better signals on the regular or the environmental tasks. A more interesting
statement is (ii), which says that the wage range under an environmental audit spans
the wage range without one. Hence, an agent may be either better or worse paid
after an environmental audit: the wage gradient becomes steeper and the agent is
bearing more risk. Statement (iii) adds, furthermore, that the relative magnitude of
-2U''/U' and -U'''/U'' determines whether the expected wage after an audit occurs
is larger or smaller than the wage when no audit has taken place. The ratio -U''/U'
is the well-known coefficient of absolute risk aversion; it captures the agent's
willingness to avoid risk. The ratio -U'''/U'', on the other hand, is the so-called
 B : (s&K&j hw) % (j U(w)h&U(s))(*%(
f
x
f
)% 8j U(w)hy $ 0 m'1
' 0 if 0 <m < 1
# 0 m'0 .
s &
U(s)
U )(s)
% j [&w %
U(w)
U )(w)
]h .
UU )) s
B
(U ))2
% j
,
[&
UU ))w
B
(U ))2
]h .
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(12)
index of absolute prudence; introduced by Kimball [22], it captures the strength
of the agent's adjustment to risk or precautionary motives. The respective size of
these two coefficients has recently been shown to play an important part in many
situations involving risk and uncertainty (see Gollier and Treich [14]). Its intuitive
role in the present context will become clearer in the next subsection, where we
discuss the optimal occurrence of environmental audits.
On the optimal occurrence of environmental audits
The main difference between monitoring and auditing is that the latter's
occurrence is contingent on specific events that can be chosen strategically by the
principal. By selecting the revenue levels B that trigger an environmental audit, the
principal can influence the agent's allocation of effort in order to raise expected
profit. The agent's reaction to the threat of audits will in turn depend on some
characteristics of his utility function. It will now be shown that only two such
characteristics - prudence and risk aversion - need to be considered in order to
design an optimal auditing policy.
The first-order necessary conditions for m(@) - the probability of making
an environmental audit - in problem (2) are given by
Using equations (5) and (6), the left-hand expression simplifies into
Taking the derivative with respect to B, we get
This reduces to
&U ))(s)s
B
(U )(s))2
[&U(s) % j
,
U(w)h(,*y) ]
j
,
U(s(B)% k(B ,,))h(,*y) & U(s(B)) .
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(14)
by equation (7). By the assumptions and proposition 1 (i), the sign of the latter
expression depends on the sign of the term within brackets. This yields the main
result of this subsection.
PROPOSITION 2: Provided K is not too high, m(B) > 0 under the following
circumstances:
(i) when B is small, if -2(U''/U') $ -U'''/U'' ;
(ii) when B is large, if -2(U''/U') < -U'''/U'' and the agent's aversion to risk is
small.
PROOF: Clearly, 3 U(w(B,,))h(,*y) - U(s(B)) # U(3 w(B,,)h(,*y)) - U(s(B)),
, ,
by the concavity of U and Jensen's inequality. Now, if -2(U''/U') $ -U'''/U'' ,
proposition 1 (iii) implies that the latter expression is nonpositive. This entails that
(13) is also nonpositive, and consequently the left-hand expression of (10) is
nonincreasing in B. Hence, if m(B) is positive, this will certainly happen at low
values of B. This proves statement (i).
To prove (ii), note that the braketed term in (13) can be written as:
By proposition 1 (iii), ' k(B,,)h(,*y) > 0. Thus (14) will be nonnegative, for all
,
B, if the agent's risk aversion is sufficiently low. In this case, the left-hand
expression in (10) will be nondecreasing. So if m(B) turns up positive, it will do so
at large values of B. Q.E.D.
The conditions of the proposition can actually be made sharper. Assume,
for instance, that the agent's utility function exhibits constant relative risk aversion.
Without loss of generality, the agent's utility in this case is of the form U(z) = ("/(1-
"))(z/") , where the coefficient of relative risk aversion, defined as -zU''(z)/U'(z),1-"
is precisely ". Note that -2U''/U' is less than, equal to, or greater than -U'''/U''
(
s
"
) and [j
,
(
w
"
)
1& " h ]
1
1& "
.
1
(s/")&"
' j
,
h
1
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,
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Baiman and Demski [1] assume that the agent's utility function belongs to the HARA family,
11
which includes utility functions with constant, increasing or decreasing absolute or relative risk aversion,
and state propositions 1 and 2 referring to the parameters of the agent's utility function instead of
comparing the index of prudence with the coefficient of absolute risk aversion. The latter approach,
however, in addition to bringing slightly more general results, contributes a clearer understanding of the
agent's effort allocation incentives.
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(15)
(16)
whenever " is less than, equal to, or greater than 1. The comparison between U(s)
and 3 U(w)h is now between
,
By (8) we have that:
Thus, s/" is larger than the right-hand term of (15), and so m(B) > 0 at low values
of B, if
" < 1/2. When " > 1/2, on the other hand, s/" becomes smaller than the right-hand
expression in (15), so m(B) is positive at high values of B.11
Let us now turn to the intuition behind propositions 1 and 2. Let us denote
the coefficient of absolute risk aversion and the index of absolute prudence by A =
-U''/U' and P = -U'''/U'' respectively. When 2A $ P, the agent's risk aversion is
high enough so that he would try hard to avoid the worst outcome of an
environmental audit, which is getting paid a low wage w(B,,) < s(B) after a small
estimate , of environmental cost reduction is observed. This implies that the agent
might spend too much effort on environmental protection, at the expense of regular
business activities. One obvious way for the principal to restore a balance is to
worsen the outcome associated with poor revenue performance: she will then run
an environmental audit when B is low and decrease the agent's expected wage in
this case. If 2A # P, on the other hand, the agent's precautionary motives clearly
dominates his risk aversion. This means that the agent will seek not so much to
A )(z)
A(z)
'
d
dz
ln(
&U ))(z)
U )(z)
) '
U )))(z)
U ))(z)
&
U ))(z)
U )(z)
' A(z) & P(z) .
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avoid the bad outcomes associated with an environmental audit, but rather to
increase his expected income when facing such an audit. This expected income is
given by3 w(B,,)h and it is increasing in B; so this time the agent might care too
,
much about regular business duties at the expense of the environment. One way for
the principal to fix this is to conduct environmental audits when B is high, and to
mitigate the agent's prudence by increasing his expected wage when an audit takes
place.
The latter situation seems to agree better with common sense and casual
observation. For it seems more plausible that business firms would deem
environmental negligence to be likely, and would therefore conduct an
environmental audit, when they get unusually high short-term revenues. This belief
is actually not inconsistent with the widely accepted assumption that absolute risk
aversion is decreasing. To see this, first note that
If absolute risk aversion decreases at a sufficiently high rate, we have that 2A # P,
and the intuitive scenario unfolds by the above propositions.
Environmental audits and effort allocation
A contract that includes the possibility of environmental audits raises the
principal's cost in two ways compared with a contract without any audits. First, it
entails the direct cost of the audits; second, it may raise the expected wage cost.
Offsetting this, however, is the increase in revenue that might come from the
reallocation of the agent's effort which the threat of audits induces. The next
proposition makes precise the set of circumstances where such an increase actually
happens.
PROPOSITION 3: The introduction of environmental audits brings an increase in
the agent's effort y directed at the environment. Moreover, if 2A $ P, or if 2A < P
and the agent is not too risk averse, a positive probability of an environmental audit
also induces an increase in the effort x spent on regular tasks.
PROOF: Consider the incentive compatibility constraint of problem (1), and
denote as EU the objective - the expected utility - which the agent seeks to
maximize. Let us compute the following cross partial derivatives:
B:
M EU
Mx Mm(B)
' j
,
[U(w(B ,,))h(,*y) & U(s(B))] f
x
(B*x) .
B:
M EU
My Mm(B)
' j
,
U(w(B ,,))h
y
(,*y) f(B*x) .
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Notice that the right-hand side of the latter equation is always positive because of
the monotone likelihood property of h. By theorem 5 in [25], it follows that the
agent's optimal environmental effort y will increase whenever m(B) increases.
Notice also that, by the results of the previous subsections, the right-hand side of
(18) is nonnegative under the circumstances described in proposition 3. Again, we
conclude that the agent's optimal effort on regular tasks would not decrease after an
increase of m(B) in the relevant range. This proves the proposition.
Q.E.D.
According to this proposition, the amounts of effort devoted by the agent
to regular activities and to environmental protection can become complementary
arguments of the agent's payoff function under an optimal audit policy. This is a
striking result, given that the agent was assumed to be indifferent a priori between
working on regular business activities versus environmental protection (x and y are
substitutes in the agent's cost function). It has an intuitive rationale, however.
Since s(B) > w(B,,)when , is small but s(B) < w(B,,) when it is large (proposition
1), the agent will always increase the effort y spent on the environment, in order to
make it more likely that the outcome of an environmental audit will be a favorable
one. But the agent can also make the occurrence of an audit more or less probable
by adjusting the effort x spent on standard business duties. If 2A > P, then audits
occur when B is low, and they are conceived as a punishment since they bring the
agent's expected wage down; in this case the agent also has an incentive to make
environmental audits less frequent, and he can do so by increasing x as well. If 2A
< P and the agent is not too risk averse, on the other hand, environmental audits are
triggered by high short-term profits B, and they constitute a reward for the agent
since they yield a higher expected wage; in this case the agent would like to be
audited and would therefore make audits more frequent by increasing his effort x.
This result has interesting implications for environmental policy. There
is an active debate nowadays as to whether stricter environmental regulation by one
18
nation would render its firms more competitive or would rather increase their cost
and therefore harm their relative market position [27, 28]. The latter proposition
suggests that a policy of promoting environmental auditing could actually be
consistent with the former scenario, as properly designed environmental audits
would also increase employees' effort on standard business duties.
5. CONCLUSION
The International Chamber of Commerce believes that effective protection of the
environment is best achieved by an appropriate combination of legislation/regulation
and of policies and programs established voluntarily by industry. (...) Environmental
auditing is an important component of such voluntary policies. [18, p. xvii-1]
The practice of environmental auditing is currently being standardized and
is spreading to many industries which, unlike the chemical industry, did not
previously use such a tool for managing environmental resources. This paper
studied a particular kind of environmental audits, where the information obtained
through an audit influences the agent's compensation. On the positive side,
proposition 3 explains why many firms might be willing to implement these
environmental audits. On the normative side, the first two propositions prescribe
that, in a context where employees have some discretion on how they will distribute
their effort between standard business functions and environmental protection, the
occurrence of environmental audits and the optimal wage structure should depend
on the importance of employees' precautionary motives relative to their risk
aversion.
We shall now make a few comments concerning environmental public
policy. As we remarked at the beginning of the paper, new environmental auditing
standards are now being actively promoted by public authorities to be voluntarily
adopted by firms. At first sight, the involvement of public policy makers may look
surprising. First, it is well known amongst environmental economists that there are
other more traditional instruments the regulator could use instead, such as command
and control regulations, effluent fees and marketable permits. These policies,
however, are conceived as constraints on profit maximization and are unconcerned
with the process by which managers solve problems. Increasingly, public policy
makers seem rather to favor instruments that "pierce the corporate veil" and take
into account management processes. Such instruments include environmental
auditing, but also court-imposed organizational remedies, product eco-labelling
According to some recent studies by the United Nations reported in [19], the world's 500 largest
12
companies are responsible for 70% of world trade, 60% of foreign investment and 30% of world gross
domestic product.
A few countries - Brazil for example - are maintaining mandatory environmental audits [see 23].
13
But this is the exception rather than the rule.
As one indication of the benefits harmonization may bring, according to [ 29] Ciba Clayton took
14
three man-years to establish the eco-management system at its first registered site in the United Kingdom,
including time talking with other companies regarding the requirements of the then-nascent standards.
The company estimates that the time would be cut by two-thirds under the final version of EMAS.
19
policies, and individual (as opposed to corporate) criminal liability. In our view,
this comes in recognition of the fact that most environmental resources are allocated
by managers within business firms, so organizational failures could be as12
important a cause of environmental depletion as market failures (i.e. externalities).
But now, why should voluntary environmental audits be a public policy
instrument? After all, the first ones were mandated by the regulator and subsequent
ones were set up by narrow then broad industry associations. Clearly, as for the13
adoption of technological standards, public support to particular rules of
environmental auditing aims at accelerating the international harmonization (and
therefore comparison) of environmental practices, since failure to achieve this may
ultimately be detrimental to trade and competition. Another set of considerations
is the impact on contracting habits and the costs of running environmental audits
that the presence of established and widespread rules for environmental auditing
may have. On the one hand, harmonization may significantly lower auditing costs.14
One can expect that over time, environmental auditing will parallel financial
auditing and be highly routinized, efficient, and reliable to both internal and external
users. On the other hand, harmonization will also make the results of environmental
audits verifiable by third parties and in particular the courts, so it should make
contingent contracts based on those results - which is precisely the type of contracts
we emphasized - feasible.
20
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